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1  Introduction 
 
Land rights have been recognised as a central human rights issue for indigenous 
peoples,1 emerging both internationally and regionally. At the international level, the 
adoption by the UN General Assembly of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2007 marked a resolute step from the international 
community in affirming indigenous peoples’ human rights, and puts a great 
emphasis on land rights. The African states under the guidance of the AU played an 
important role in shaping this declaration.2 This reflects the developments regarding 
indigenous peoples’ human rights that have been taking place at the regional level, 
particularly the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), which 
established a Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities in 2001 with 
the mandate to examine the situation of indigenous peoples on the continent. 3  
A central issue of contention concerned the definition of indigenous peoples, 
with several States proposing that in Africa all inhabitants are indigenous,4  and 
viewing the legal emergence of such a category of rights-holders as potentially a 
cause of “tension among ethnic groups and instability between sovereign States.”5 
                                                            
1  See: “Indigenous people and their relationship to land”, Final working paper prepared by Mrs. 
Erica-Irene A. Daes, Special Rapporteur. UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21; Jérémie Gilbert, 
Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors (2007). 
2  For an analysis, see A Barume ‘Responding to the Concerns of the African States’, in C 
Charters & R Stavenhagen (eds) Making The Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on 
The Rights Of Indigenous Peoples (2009); W Genugten ‘Protection of Indigenous Peoples on the 
African Continent’ (2010) 104 (1) American Journal of International Law 29. 
3  N Kealeboga & GM Wachira ‘Protecting Indigenous Peoples in Africa’ (2006) 6 African 
Human Rights Law Journal 382. 
4  H Weber et al (eds) “Never drink from the same cup: Proceedings of the conference on 
Indigenous Peoples in Africa” (1993); A Bernard & J Kenrick (eds) Africa’s Indigenous Peoples: 
Peoples: ‘first peoples’ or ‘marginalised minorities’? (2001). 
5  African Group, “Aide-memoire of the African Group on the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (2006). 
Adopting a pragmatic approach, the ACHPR has highlighted that “in Africa, the term 
indigenous populations does not mean ‘first inhabitants’ in reference to aboriginality 
as opposed to non-African communities or those having come from elsewhere.”6 The 
Commission has emphasised that there is no universally agreed definition of the 
term indigenous peoples, and that the most constructive approach is to refer to 
common characteristics which allow for the identification of indigenous peoples in 
Africa. The Commission explains that a first major characteristic is self-
identification, which implies that a people initially identify itself as indigenous. A 
second major characteristic is indigenous peoples’ “special attachment to and use of 
their traditional land whereby their ancestral land and territory have a fundamental 
importance for their collective physical and cultural survival as peoples.”7 Finally, the 
Commission adds that indigenous peoples are often communities which face “a state 
of subjugation, marginalisation, dispossession, exclusion, or discrimination because 
these peoples have different cultures, ways of life or mode of production than the 
national hegemonic and dominant model.”8  
As the work of the ACHPR highlights, access and security over land rights are 
the principal issues for indigenous peoples. With the establishment of protected 
areas and the ever increasing exploitation of natural resources, indigenous peoples 
have experienced large scale displacements and often been evicted without 
compensation or alternative land. Most of them hold no formal legal title to land 
under national tenure laws, which means that they have technically become squatters 
on their own lands or on other people’s lands, and suffer permanent risk of eviction. 
In some cases, indigenous peoples are allowed to remain on land owned by non-
indigenous communities in exchange for agricultural work; others are allowed to stay 
on land owned by charitable organisations. Land rights will determine whether 
indigenous peoples have the right to remain on their lands, or at least get 
compensation for their expulsion, and are not only crucial to their cultural survival as 
peoples but also for their livelihoods and economic development. By becoming 
landless most indigenous communities have been pushed into further economic and 
spatial marginalisation, living in extremely vulnerable conditions. Loss of access to 
their traditional territories is often synonymous with marginalisation, homelessness, 
increased mortality, food insecurity, and social disarticulation arising from the 
forced change of lifestyle. Securing access and ownership of land therefore remains a 
critical concern for many indigenous communities. 
International law, and more particularly international human rights law, has 
for some time been seen as a positive tool to support indigenous peoples’ rights; 
when it comes to land rights, however, such positivity is new. September 2007 
marked the start of a new era for indigenous peoples, with the adoption of the 
UNDRIP. Despite this recent development, international law has historically played a 
negative role regarding indigenous peoples’ rights, and more especially their rights to 
land. An important tool in the hands of the colonial powers, international law has 
been a central vehicle in the dispossession of indigenous peoples. Most of the rules 
                                                            
6  ACHPR “Advisory Opinion on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”, 41st 
Ordinary Session, Accra, Ghana, May 2007. 
7  Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous 
Populations/Communities submitted in accordance with ‘Resolution on the Rights of Indigenous 
Populations/Communities in Africa adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights at its 28th ordinary session (2005)  93 
8  Report of the African Commission’s Working Group (n 7 above). 
regarding title to territory under international law were aimed at justifying the 
dispossession of indigenous peoples of their lands. While various legal systems 
applied, during colonisation, to land rights for indigenous peoples – depending on 
which state was the coloniser – international law played the role of common 
denominator, ensuring that all powers adhered to the same legal doctrine. The rules 
governing title to territory under international law became the basis of the ‘rules of 
the game’ between the colonial powers, and as such had a direct impact on 
indigenous peoples’ land rights. Because of this legacy, international law still plays a 
huge part in the contemporary situations faced by indigenous communities 
throughout the continent today, a legacy now being challenged by international 
human rights law.  
The first part of this chapter retraces in history the manner in which territory 
was acquired by the State according to international law with a view to analysing the 
consequences of this acquisition for indigenous peoples. It examines to what extent 
international legal rules designed by colonial powers directly and indirectly affected 
indigenous peoples’ land rights. It is argued that international law played an 
important role in such colonial operation, serving as a basis to establish the rule of 
territorial rights.  In contrast, the second section highlights that contemporary 
international human rights law has supported the recognition of indigenous peoples’ 
rights over their traditional territories. By undertaking such a historical approach to 
land rights, the chapter analyses to what extent contemporary international human 
rights standards support the recognition of the land rights of indigenous 
communities. The emergence of a specific body of law regarding indigenous peoples’ 
rights is becoming important for Africa. The rights to land, and also the emerging 
international legal standards on free, prior and informed consent, could potentially 
play a key role in the future relationship between States, investors, and indigenous 
peoples. By focusing on both the history of international law and   contemporary 
human rights law standards, this chapter examines the sometimes contradictory 
rules, on the one hand rules governing territorial possession by states, and on the 
other hand human rights law arguing for the recognition of indigenous peoples’ land 
rights.  
 
2   International Law, Colonisation and Land Rights 
 
Ironically, the universalisation of international law was principally a consequence of 
the imperial expansion that took place in past centuries, as the development of 
international law was primarily guided by the establishment of rules governing title 
to territory over newly colonised countries. For the African continent, these rules 
were crucial in defining land titles both for the colonial powers and for the so-called 
‘native’ populations. In what is now referred to as the ‘scramble for Africa’9, colonial 
powers needed rules to divide the continent between themselves, and to justify the 
colonial enterprise of taking lands from the ‘natives’. Most of the rules regarding title 
to territory under international law were based on these two premises.  
 
2.1  International Law and the ‘Civilising’ Mission 
 
                                                            
9  TF Pakenham The Scramble for Africa (1991). 
The colonial enterprise, especially during the new imperialist period (1880-1914), 
justified itself under a banner of ‘Commerce, Christianity and Civilisation’. While 
ultimately the primary goal of colonisation was undoubtedly trade expansion, the 
notion of ‘Civilisation’ provided the colonial powers with a moral vindication, the 
equation being: ‘Commerce plus Christianity equals Civilisation’. Especially in Africa 
a ‘civilizing mission’ was proposed as the main justification for the colonial 
enterprise. Illustrations of such a ‘civilizing mission’ can be found in the Berlin 
Conference (1884-85), which played a huge role in the development of the 
international ‘rules’ regarding the colonisation of Africa. The Berlin Conference 
represented one of the first gatherings of the main colonial powers and the first 
formal recognition of their different ‘spheres of influences’.  Concomitant to the 
prevailing ‘mission civilisatrice’ governing that period the Final Act refers to colonial 
states’ mission to bring the ‘blessings of civilisation’ to the African continent. The 
development of international law throughout that period contains many references 
to ‘civilizing mission’ (‘mission civilisatrice’), providing colonial powers with rules 
justifying territorial dispossession of indigenous peoples in Africa. 10 
A legal consequence of this ‘civilising mission’ was the doctrine of trusteeship, 
and the ‘humanitarian’ call to help the ‘natives’ (or ‘primitives’) to join the 
‘enlightenment’ and stop their ‘barbaric’ traditions. As a result colonial powers (or 
‘civilised’ powers) had to act in a spirit of trusteeship towards the non-civilised native 
populations. The trusteeship doctrine is summarised in a 1919 decision from the 
Privy Council which stated that: “some tribes are so low in the scale of social 
organization that their usages and conceptions of rights and duties are not to be 
reconciled with institutions or the legal ideas of civilized society.”11 Behind this veil of 
‘civilising mission’ European powers took control of the lands in the hands of 
indigenous communities, not for their own interest but for the benefit of indigenous 
people themselves. This international doctrine of a trusteeship mission was 
translated into colonial laws, as most (if not all) colonial powers put in place a system 
of land control for the ‘most uncivilised’. In central Africa such a doctrine can be 
found in legislation up to the 1950’s. For example, a 1952 decree in the Congo stated 
that, to be able to register a right to land, native peoples had to prove their degree of 
education and civilisation.12 In practical terms the trusteeship doctrine resulted in 
the establishment of reserved lands or reservations for indigenous communities, 
conferring a right of usage for native communities with a restriction on their ability 
to alienate such lands (as the aim was to ‘protect’ them). Even today reserved lands 
for indigenous peoples are based upon hypocritical humanitarian grounds (to allow 
indigenous peoples to enable to maintain a reasonable standard of existence), and on 
the absolute control of the government over such right (the government holds the 
ultimate title to the land). 
The colonialist distinction between ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ societies had 
another consequence for land rights for indigenous peoples through the notion of 
‘pre-existing rights’. Under colonial rules, when a colonial power took control of a 
territory there was an obligation to recognise ‘pre-existing rights’, including land 
                                                            
10  M Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (2002) 
11  Privy Council, In Re Southern Rhodesia (1919) AC 211, 233 - 234. 
12  Décret du 17 mai 1952 sur l’immatriculation des indigènes. tout indigène ayant justifié par sa 
formation et sa manière de vivre d’un état de civilisation impliquant l’aptitude de jouir des droits et à 
remplir les devoirs prescrits par la législation écrite pouvait passer du régime de la coutume au régime 
du droit écrit.  
rights, in that territory. The Final Act of the Berlin Conference stipulated that 
colonial states had to exercise their authority in such a way as to protect existing 
rights within the territory (Article 35 of the Final Act). In theory such recognition of 
‘pre-existing rights’ could have some important consequences for indigenous 
peoples, as if their rights were ‘pre-existing’ the colonial legal regime they could 
‘survive’ it. However, in the words of Westlake, a prominent nineteenth century 
publicist: not “all rights are denied to such natives, but that the appreciation of their 
rights is left to the conscience of the state within whose recognised territorial 
sovereignty they are comprised…”13 This statement accurately highlights how the 
recognition of pre-existing land rights was in the absolute control of the colonial 
power. Lindley, in his seminal work on the acquisition of territory, also highlighted 
the distinction made by the colonial states between the recognition of ‘civilised’ and 
‘un-civilised’ pre-existing rights, with states rejecting the notion of ‘uncivilised’ pre-
existing rights to land (such as customary indigenous peoples’ laws).14 Some 
contemporary land claims at the national level (especially under the common law) 
have started to examine what pre-existing rights ‘survived’ the colonial rules.15  Some 
courts have stated to examine to what extent indigenous peoples ‘pre-existing’ laws 
could have survived colonisation, and what their impact could be in contemporary 
land claims, notably in the Ritchersveld decision of the Supreme Court of South 
Africa.16  
One consequence of the colonial era’s classification of societies on a scale of 
‘civilisation’ is the view of nomadic societies. Under the tenets of international law, 
nomadic peoples were traditionally considered to be at the bottom of the scale. By 
being nomadic they had no right to the land, as one of the rules of territorial 
occupation under international law is the principle of effective use of the land. Only 
agricultural societies were deemed to use lands effectively, and nomadic peoples 
were considered as only wandering across territories and therefore having no rights 
to occupation. The assumption was that nomadic peoples’ territories were not used 
productively and therefore should be regarded as empty and opens to colonisation. 
Nomadic peoples’ territories were regarded as terra nullius, lands belonging to no-
one. This assumption was partially challenged only in 1975 when the ICJ in its 
advisory opinion on the Western Sahara recognised that nomadic peoples could also 
exercise some form of social and political organisation, but fell short of recognising 
the capacity of nomadic peoples to exercise territorial sovereignty. 17 As highlighted 
by Reisman, “the Court formally acknowledged the existence of a theory of 
international land tenure based on a non-European conception of title as generative 
of ‘legal ties’ .... But such ‘legal ties’ were not enough to defeat title deriving from 
European colonial claim.”18 The view that only societies with a permanent settled 
population can exercise territorial control remained. This historical bias against 
nomadic communities still has some impact in contemporary land claims, as most 
nomadic communities throughout the continent have only very limited access to 
                                                            
13  J Westlake Chapters on the Principles of International Law (1894) 138 
14  MF Lindley The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory  (1969). 
15  J Gilbert, ‘Historical Indigenous Peoples' Land Claims’ (2007) 56 (3) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 538 – 611. 
16         Richtersveld Community and Others v Alexkor Ltd and Another 2003 (6) BCLR 583 (SCA). 
17  ICJ, Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion,  ICJ Reports 1975 
18  M Resiman, ‘Protecting Indigenous Rights in International Adjudication’ (1995) 89(2) 
American Journal of International Law 354 - 355. 
legal titles to their lands, and the dominant assumption is still that they do not 
‘effectively’ occupy their lands. 
2.2  The Principle of ‘Effective Occupation’  
 
In contrast to other instances of colonisation, where European colonial powers just 
decided that the colonised territories were empty and therefore open to colonisation 
(Australia, Americas), in the case of Africa (at least following the Berlin Conference) 
colonial powers had to establish formal legal ties with the local populations to 
establish their authorities. Article 35 of the Final Act stated:  
The signatory powers of the present Act recognise the obligation to insure the establishment 
of authority in the regions occupied by them on the coasts of the African Continent sufficient 
to protect existing rights (droit acquis) and, as the case may be, freedom of trade and of 
transit under the conditions agreed upon.19  
 
While the Final Act remained vague regarding the implementation of the principle of 
effective occupation, it had several long-lasting consequences for the development of 
the international rules regarding title to territory in Africa.  
One of the first consequences was that colonial powers renewed their use of 
chartered companies as agent of the state. As in most situations the effective control 
of huge territories was deemed too expensive for the administrative systems of the 
colonial states, and so states granted rights to private companies (often referred to as 
chartered companies), not only trading rights but also rights regarding the 
administration of the colonised territories, including territorial rights. Thus 
chartered companies became important actors regarding land rights for the local 
communities, sometimes over huge areas of lands. For example, the UK placed the 
area corresponding to what is today Uganda under the charter of the IBEAC  in 1888, 
and ruled it as a protectorate from 1894. At some stage chartered companies were 
responsible for securing control over 75 per cent of British territory in sub-Saharan 
Africa.20 Similar processes were followed by the French, German, Portuguese and 
Dutch administrations, so that private trading companies could act as the colonial 
power with rights over land and natural resources.21 Chartered companies also had 
the power to enter into treaty relationship with communities, such treaties often 
having territorial consequences.  While treaties with indigenous populations have 
always been part of the colonial enterprise, following the Berlin Conference colonial 
powers (mainly through their chartered companies) entered into a period of intense 
treaty making with African leaders and communities. In the end of the nineteenth 
century, Africa (and especially West and Central Africa) witnessed a ‘race’ between 
the main colonial powers in trying to sign as many treaties as possible with local 
chiefs, to ensure the transfer of the lands. 22  While the forms of these treaties vary 
across the continent, usually they involved a notion of peaceful relationship and 
provided for the cession of land ownership from the African communities.23 These 
                                                            
19  Note that such obligation of effective occupation was repeated in the 1919 Convention of Saint 
Germain in its article 10. 
20  JE Flint, ‘Chartered Companies and the Transition from Informal Sway to Colonial Rule in 
Africa’ in S Forster et al (eds), Bismarck, Europe, and Africa 69-83  
21  On the power of such companies, see decision from the Privy Council in Southern Rhodesia (n 
11 above). 
22  An account of such race for treaty making is available in Lindley (n 14 above) 34-36. 
23  For detailed analysis of these treaties and the role of international law, see J Castellino & S 
Allen Title to Territory in International Law (2003). 
treaties were then used by the colonial powers as proof to ensure the transfer of 
sovereignty in their favour.  
3.3   Contemporary African and international human rights law 
In contrast with the rationales behind colonial law-making processes, human rights 
developments since the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights have created 
legal norms that operate according to a different paradigm. While traditionally 
international law is concerned with the rights of states to claim title to territory, 
human rights law focuses on the rights of the peoples living in those states. Hence 
international human rights law starts from a different perspective on land rights: it 
requires that indigenous peoples’ ownership and other rights to their lands, 
territories and resources be legally recognised and respected. It connects those land 
rights to a variety of other rights, including the general prohibition against racial 
discrimination, the right to property, the right to cultural integrity and the right to 
self-determination.  
This section explains some relevant human rights standards pertaining to 
indigenous peoples’ right to land, including provisions from the AU’s instruments, 
the UN system and the ILO. Those sets of standards are applicable to African 
countries, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights can be interpreted 
by reference to other international human rights instruments and decisions.24 The 
analysis of those standards reveals an important gap between the human rights 
situation of indigenous peoples and the human rights protection provided by legal 
standards. Their implementation remains challenging, but they form the core 
guiding principles to which states have committed themselves as members of 
intergovernmental bodies, through their ratification and participation in the 
adoption of these instruments.  
3.3.1 The right to land  
In the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1986, the right to property is 
guaranteed, but can be ‘encroached upon in the interest of the public need or in the 
General interest of the community and in accordance with the provisions of 
appropriate laws’.25 This restriction could at first glance be taken to provide 
justification for evictions and displacements of indigenous peoples, but the right to 
property should be interpreted alongside other provisions of the charter, and the 
work of the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples/Communities. 
The Working Group on Indigenous Peoples/Communities is a special mechanism 
of the ACHPR, the human rights organ of the regional inter-governmental African 
Union. It was established in 2001, and part of its role is to research the human rights 
situation of indigenous peoples in Africa and to formulate recommendations to 
prevent and provide remedy for violations of indigenous peoples’ human rights. In 
an extensive report adopted in 2003, the working group explained that: 
                                                            
24         Article 60 of the African Charter. 
25  Article 14 of the African Charter. 
The protection of rights to land and natural resources is fundamental for the survival of 
indigenous communities in Africa and such protection relates… to Articles 20, 21, 22 and 24 
of the African Charter26 
 
These Articles provide the rights of all peoples to: existence and self determination; 
freely dispose of their wealth and resources and, in case of dispossession, the right to 
recover their property and be compensated; development and equal enjoyment of the 
common heritage; and a general satisfactory environment favourable to their 
development. They amount to a solid legal protection of indigenous peoples’ land 
rights in Africa.  
 
The report of the working group further emphasises that a major problem 
leading to the loss of indigenous peoples’ land in Africa is that customary collective 
tenure was neither recognised nor secured. Instead, land occupied by pastoralists 
and hunter–gatherers was defined as terra nullius. Also collective land titles are not 
granted by most national laws, and yet: ‘Collective tenure is fundamental to most 
indigenous pastoralist and hunter gatherer communities, and one of the major 
requests of indigenous communities is therefore the recognition and protection of 
collective forms of land tenure’.27  
The ACPHR, by endorsing the report of the working group, has acknowledged 
that the land rights of indigenous peoples have been violated: 
The land alienation and dispossession and dismissal of their customary rights to land and 
other natural resources has led to an undermining of the knowledge systems through which 
indigenous peoples have sustained life for centuries and it has led to a negation of their 
livelihood systems and deprivation of their means. This is seriously threatening the continued 
existence of indigenous peoples and is rapidly turning them into the most destitute and 
poverty stricken. This is a serious violation of the African Charter (Article 20, 21 and 22), 
which states clearly that all peoples have the right to existence, the right to their natural 
resources and property, and the right to their economic, social and cultural development.28  
 
In 2009, the ACHPR issued a decision on the first formal complaint received about 
indigenous peoples’ land rights, submitted by the Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (CEMIRIDE) on behalf of the Endorois Community against the 
government of Kenya.29  A nature reserve was established by the Kenyan government 
in the 1970s in the Lake Bogoria region on lands inhabited since time immemorial by 
the indigenous Endorois pastoralist communities. When the reserve was created the 
Endorois were evicted and relocated without compensation, and in vain sought 
redress in Kenya’s national courts. They continued to face contestation from the state 
when they brought their case before the ACHPR. The ACHPR’s decision constitutes 
an extensive and clear piece of jurisprudence, which is unequivocal on the definition 
of indigenous peoples and the necessity to recognise their ownership rights over their 
ancestral lands.  
The ACHPR built on definitions provided by the UN, the ILO and its Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities to clarify the contested terms, and 
noted that:  
                                                            
26  Report of the African Commission’s Working Group (n 7 above) 21. 
27  Report of the African Commission’s Working Group (n 7 above) 22. 
28  Report of the African Commission’s Working Group (n 7 above) 108. 
29  Complaint No. 276 / 2003 – Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority 
Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya. Decision adopted by the 
ACHPR in May 2009 and endorsed by the AU Assembly of Heads of State in February 2010. 
there is a common thread that runs through all the various criteria that attempt to describe 
indigenous peoples – that indigenous peoples have an unambiguous relationship to a distinct 
territory and that all attempts to define the concept recognise the linkages between people, 
their land, and culture.30 
 
The ACHPR found that Articles 1, 8,14,17,21 and 22 of the African Charter had been 
violated, referring respectively to: the duty of States to recognise the rights enshrined 
in the Charter; the right to practice religion; the right to property; the right to 
culture; the right of peoples to the free disposal of their natural resources; and the 
right of peoples to development. It recommended that the State of Kenya:  
 
(a) Recognise rights of ownership to the Endorois and restitute Endorois ancestral land.  
(b) Ensure that the Endorois community has unrestricted access to Lake Bogoria and 
surrounding sites for religious and cultural rites and for grazing their cattle. 
(c) Pay adequate compensation to the community for all the loss suffered.  
(d) Pay royalties to the Endorois from existing economic activities and ensure that they 
benefit from employment possibilities within the Reserve. 
(e)  Grant registration to the Endorois Welfare Committee. 
(f) Engage in dialogue with the Complainants for the effective implementation of these 
recommendations. 
(g) Report on the implementation of these recommendations within three months from the 
date of notification.  
 
This ground-breaking decision has become the most important precedent in 
international human rights law with regard to indigenous peoples land rights in 
Africa. 
 
These rights are also affirmed by the UNDRIP of 2007, which states that 
indigenous peoples have the ‘right to the lands, territories and resources which they 
have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.’31 This also 
comprises ‘the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and 
resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional 
occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired.’32 
Furthermore, the UNDRIP affirms that states’ duty to guarantee the right to land 
must be realised in respect of tradition and land tenure systems of indigenous 
peoples. The vast majority of UN member states voted in favour of its adoption, and 
no African country voted against it.33  
 
African indigenous peoples’ right to land also stems from fundamental 
binding international treaties. The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) of 1966 protects the right of ethnic, religious and linguistic 
minorities to enjoy in community their own culture, practices, religion and 
language.34 The Covenant also affirms the right of all peoples to self-determination 
                                                            
30          (n 29 above)  para 154 
31  Article 26 (1) of UNDRIP. 
32  Article 26 (2) of UNDRIP. 
33  The African Group submitted an ‘Aide mémoire’ to the United Nations session in November 
2006 in New York. Namibia and Botswana led this group, which raised several concerns concerning 
the adoption of the Declaration. These concerns were responded to by expert NGOs and the African 
Commission’ Working Group on Indigenous Peoples/Communities. The Declaration was adopted 
without any African vote against in 2007. See the Advisory Opinion of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples Rights Concerning the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, adopted at the 40th Ordinary session of ACHPR, May 2007, Accra, Ghana. 
34  Article 27 of ICCPR. 
and freely to dispose of their natural wealth, and fifty AU member states ratified it. 
The UN Human Rights Committee, the body monitoring the implementation of the 
ICCPR, linked the right to land to cultural rights guaranteed in the Covenant, and 
advised that measures be taken to restitute to indigenous peoples their native 
lands.35  
 
The ILO has adopted two Conventions pertaining to indigenous peoples’ 
rights: Convention 107 (ILO 107) of 1957 and Convention 169  (ILO 169) of 1989.36 
Their content is, however, only partially applicable in Africa, as African states have 
not yet broadly ratified these instruments.37 Yet the two Conventions are part of the 
ILO’s standards on indigenous land rights and represent the views of a major 
intergovernmental organisation.  
 
While ILO 107 has been superseded and replaced by ILO 169, it remains in 
force for those countries which ratified it but have not ratified ILO 169. ILO 107 
states that ‘The right of ownership, collective or individual, of the members of the 
population concerned over the lands which these populations traditionally occupy 
shall be recognized’. The Committee of Experts stated that the fact that a people has 
some form of relationship with land currently occupied, even if only for a short time, 
was sufficient to form an interest and, therefore, rights to that land and the attendant 
resources.38  
 
ILO 169 contains a number of provisions on the territorial rights of indigenous 
peoples. It requires that governments recognise and respect the special spiritual, 
cultural and economic relationship that indigenous peoples have with their lands and 
territories, and especially the collective aspects of this relationship.39 It further 
affirms that states shall recognise indigenous peoples’ collective rights of ownership 
and possession over the lands which they traditionally occupy, and take the 
necessary measures to identify these lands and to guarantee effective protection of 
indigenous peoples’ rights of ownership and possession.40 Finally, it states that 
indigenous peoples may be relocated only as an exceptional measure and only with 
their free and informed consent, and stipulates the measures to be taken in the event 
of relocation.41  
3.3.2  A matter of equality and non-discrimination  
 
When indigenous peoples claim their land rights, they claim the rights to equality 
and non-discrimination. Discrimination was both a catalyst in and a consequence of 
their loss of ancestral lands. Human rights standards pertaining to discrimination 
issues are thus fundamental to indigenous land rights. At the international level, the 
                                                            
35  Concluding observations by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
Australia, 24 March 2000, CERD/C/56/Misc. 42/rev. 3. 
36  ILO 169 came into force in 1991. 
37  ILO 107 is ratified by only a few and ILO 169 by none. Angola, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, 
Malawi and Tunisia have ratified ILO 107. However, both the Central African Republic and Cameroon 
have actively started a process of negotiation towards the potential adoption of ILO 169. See ILO 
Programme to Promote ILO Convention No. 169. 
38  International Labour Conference, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations, Report III (4A), (1988) 287. 
39  Article 13 (1) of ILO 169. 
40  Article 14 of ILO 169. 
41  Article 16 (2) of ILO 169. 
rights to equality and non-discrimination are guaranteed in numerous international 
instruments, including the UDHR,42 the ICCPR43 and the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination.  
 
The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the 
body responsible for monitoring of the CEFRD of 1969 affirms that it: 
 
calls upon States parties to recognize and protect the rights of indigenous peoples to own, 
develop, control and use their communal lands, territories and resources and, where they 
have been deprived of their lands and territories traditionally owned or otherwise inhabited 
or used without their free and informed consent, to take steps to return those lands and 
territories. Only when this is for factual reasons not possible, the right to restitution should 
be substituted by the right to just, fair and prompt compensation. Such compensation should 
as far as possible take the form of lands and territories.44 
 
At the regional level, rights to non-discrimination and equality are guaranteed by the 
African Charter, and equality of all peoples is explicitly protected. 45  The Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities of the African Commission explains 
how different indigenous groups in central Africa suffer from being looked down 
upon by other members of the society, how in many places they are dehumanised 
and described as creatures, and how the rest of the population would prefer them to 
‘settle down and abandon their way of life and imitate their own way of living and 
earning’. The working group declares that: ‘the rampant discrimination towards 
indigenous peoples is a violation of the African Charter’.46  
 
While it is clear to the ACHPR that groups of hunter-gatherers from the African 
forests, such as the Batwa, Baka and Bagyeli, are indigenous peoples as understood 
in international law,47 the Commission also acknowledges that ‘very few African 
countries recognise the existence of indigenous peoples in their countries’ and ‘even 
fewer recognise them in their national constitutions or legislation’.48 In many African 
countries, the use of the term indigenous peoples – and by extension the 
implementation of international standards pertaining to indigenous peoples – has 
revealed a challenge because of its colonial meaning relating to natives or first 
inhabitants. It was argued by some African states that the meaning of ‘indigenous’ in 
their constitution is not the same as the one under international law.49 Some African 
states have also declared that implementing the rights of indigenous peoples under 
international law will generate conflicts as it risks being seen as preferential 
treatment. Rwanda, for example, explained to the AHCPR during the examination of 
its state report in November 2007, that, because of the genocide of 1994, the 
government could not integrate the concept of indigenous peoples, and claimed that 
every Rwandan was equal, there were no indigenous peoples in Rwanda, and 
                                                            
42  Article 7 of UDHR. 
43  Article 26 of ICCPR.  
44  General Recommendation XXIII of 1997. 
45  UN CEFRD, General Recommendation XXIII (51) concerning Indigenous Peoples, adopted at 
the 1235th meeting, 18 August 1997, UN Doc. CERD/C/51/Misc. 13/Rev. 4, paragraph 5; and article 2 
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46  Article 19 ACHPR; ACHPR Report (n 7 above) 35 – 36. 
47  ACHPR Report (n 7 above) 95 – 97. 
48  ACHPR Report (n 7 above) 107. For a definition of indigenous peoples see 86 – 104. 
49         See for example the constitution of Cameroon and of Uganda 
therefore the legal concept of indigenous peoples and its different protections did not 
apply to the country. 50  
 
However, as stated by the ACHPR, reactions such as that of the Rwandan 
government reveal a misunderstanding of the status of indigenous peoples. 
According to the Commission: 
 
One of the misconceptions regarding indigenous peoples is that to advocate for the 
protection of the rights of indigenous peoples would be to give special rights to some ethnic 
groups over and above the rights of all other groups within a state. This is not the case. The 
issue is not special rights. As explained above, the issue is that certain marginalised groups 
are discriminated [against] in particular ways because of their particular culture, mode of 
production and marginalised position within the state. This is a form of discrimination which 
other groups within the state do not suffer from. It is legitimate for these marginalised 
groups to call for protection of their rights in order to alleviate this particular form of 
discrimination.51 
 
The Commission further explains a related misconception: ‘talking about indigenous 
right will lead to tribalism and ethnic conflicts’, and responds that human rights 
promote multiculturalism and diversity, while the conception of unity and 
assimilation that causes conflicts. 52  African countries should not, therefore, fear that 
accepting the concept of indigenous peoples will cause conflicts in the country and 
divide their peoples.  
 
3.3.3  Conservation practices and customary use of land and natural 
resources 
 
Relevant norms on indigenous land rights can also be found in instruments 
pertaining to environmental conservation. The Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) of 1992 was ratified by many African states, and its preamble recognises 
 
the close and traditional dependence of many indigenous and local communities embodying 
traditional lifestyles on biological resources, and the desirability of sharing equitably benefits 
arising from the use of traditional knowledge, innovations and practices relevant to the 
conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components. 53  
 
The respect and preservation of traditional knowledge relevant for the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological diversity is also promoted and protected.54 The CBD 
further provides that states should ‘protect and encourage customary use of 
biological resources in accordance with traditional cultural practices that are 
compatible with conservation or sustainable use requirements.’55 This includes 
indigenous agriculture, agro-forestry, hunting, fishing, gathering, use of medicinal 
plants, and other subsistence activities. This article, by implication, should also be 
read to include protection for the land base, ecosystem and environment in which 
                                                            
50  There are no official transcripts of the oral response delivered in public session during the 
ACHPR meeting in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo, in November 2007. However, unofficial notes 
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51  ACHPR Indigenous Peoples in Africa: the Forgotten Peoples?  (2006) 11–12. 
52  ACHPR Report (N.7 above) 88. 
53  The CBD entered into force in 1993. 
54  Article 8 (j) of CBD. 
55  Article 10 (c) CBD. 
those resources are found, as acknowledged in the Addis Ababa Principles and 
Guidelines on Sustainable Use of Biodiversity of 2004.56  
 
In addition, in 2000, states party to the CBD adopted guidelines for the 
conduct of cultural, environmental and social impact assessments to help develop a 
collaborative framework within which governments, indigenous and local 
communities, decision makers and managers of developments can act. It also gives 
advice on the incorporation of cultural, environmental – including biodiversity-
related – and social considerations of indigenous and local communities into new or 
existing impact-assessment procedures.57 
 
The African Convention on Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 
in its revised version adopted in 2003,58 provides that states should take measures 
‘to ensure that traditional rights and intellectual property rights of local communities 
including farmers’ rights are respected’.59 The Convention further recognises that 
access to indigenous knowledge requires prior and informed consent from 
communities.60 This Convention revises the 1968 version, which did not integrate 
specific provisions for peoples’ rights and was solely oriented towards the protection 
of soil, flora, fauna and other natural resources. The revised Convention is not yet in 
force, as only eight states have so far ratified it since its adoption.61 The Convention 
has potential for indigenous land rights if its provisions are interpreted in 
conjunction with other relevant international and regional standards, first and 
foremost, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the work of the 
African Commission’s working group on indigenous populations/communities.  
 
Another useful guideline in the context of conservation and land rights is the 
African Model Legislation for the Protection of the Rights of Local Communities, 
Farmers and Breeders, and for the Regulation of Access to Biological Resources, 
developed in 2000 by the OAU, and   designed to provide guidelines for access and 
benefit-sharing regimes with respect to biodiversity. 62 In 2004, more than half of 
African countries had taken steps to adopt legislation based on the model law.63 The 
model legislation promotes and supports traditional and indigenous technologies for 
the conservation and sustainable use of biological resources, guides states into 
recognising local and indigenous communities’ collective rights to their biological 
                                                            
56  Adopted by the VIIth Conference of Parties to the CBD, especially in Principles 1 and 2. 
Principle 2 provides that ‘sustainability is generally enhanced if Governments recognize and respect 
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ecosystems in terms of their own economic, cultural and societal needs. Indigenous peoples and other 
local communities living on the land are important stakeholders and their rights and interests should 
be recognized.’ 
57  Secretariat of the CBD Akwé: Kon Guidelines (2004).   
58  African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (2003). 
59  Article XVII (1) of African Convention (n 58 above). 
60  Article XVII (2) of African Convention (n 58 above). 
61  According to Article XXXVIII fifteen ratifications are required for its entry into force.  
62  OAU (2000), available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/measures/abs/msr-abs-oau-en.pdf. 
63  N Zerbe ‘Biodiversity, ownership and indigenous knowledge’ (2005) 54 Ecological Economics 
493 – 506. 
resources, and includes an obligation to obtain prior and informed consent of 
indigenous and local communities to access resources.64  
 
3.4  Participation and consent 
 
The principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) is possibly the most 
dramatic example of the paradigm shift since the international colonial era to the 
modern conception of international human rights law. In contemporary 
international law, indigenous peoples’ have the right to participate in decision-
making and to give or withhold their consent to activities affecting their traditional 
lands, territories and resources. International human rights law places clear and 
substantial obligations on states in connection with resource exploitation on 
indigenous lands and territories. Several decisions of intergovernmental human 
rights bodies have established the rights of indigenous peoples to free prior and 
informed consent, founded upon an understanding of the full range of issues. 65 
 
The UNDRIP (2007) explicitly stipulates the right to FPIC.66 The CBD 
requires that the traditional knowledge of indigenous and local communities may be 
used only with their ‘approval’.67 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR) has developed considerable jurisprudence on FPIC.68 The African 
Commission also used this principle in the case of the Ogoni people of Nigeria 
considering the impact of oil exploration on them through an analysis of both the 
economic and social rights and the collective rights in the Charter. 69  The 
Government of Nigeria was part of a consortium involved in oil production in 
Ogoniland, part of the oil-rich Niger delta region. Local Ogoni communities were not 
involved in the decisions affecting development of their region, and production 
activities were carried out without regard for their health or environment. A number 
of oil spills contaminated the water and soil, causing short- and long-term health 
consequences for the Ogoni people, due in part to the lack of proper safety measures. 
When the Ogoni people protested, state military forces carried out violent and often 
lethal attacks against them. The Commission found a violation of the right of peoples 
to a general satisfactory environment,70 linking it with a violation of the individual’s 
right to health.71 Moreover, the Commission found a violation of the right of peoples 
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Article 8 (j) and Related Provisions of the CBD (2001) 11. 
68  See, inter alia, IACHR Report No. 27/98 (Nicaragua), para 142; Report No. 96/03, Maya 
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71  Article 16 of African Charter. 
freely to dispose of their wealth and natural resources,72 since the government failed 
to involve Ogoni communities in the decision-making regarding oil exploration.73 In 
the Endorois case, the ACHPR also expressed the view that, in any development or 
investment project, the state had a duty to seek the free prior and informed consent 
of indigenous communities, which had not been respected by the Government of 
Kenya.74 
 
 
3.5  The right to reparation 
 
According to international legal principles and standards, indigenous peoples have a 
right to reparation for the human rights violations they have experienced, including 
restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-
repetition.75 Reparation is intended to relieve the suffering of and afford justice to 
victims ‘by removing or redressing to the extent possible the consequences of the 
wrongful acts and by preventing and deterring violations’.76 One basic aspect of the 
right to reparation is the availability of effective remedies.77 
 
Theo van Boven, UN Special Rapporteur on the right to restitution, 
compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human rights, 
states in his landmark UN study on reparations that: 
 
Restitution shall be provided to re-establish, to the extent possible, the situation that existed 
for the victim prior to the violations of human rights. Restitution requires, inter alia, 
restoration of liberty, citizenship or residence, employment or property.78  
 
The Inter-American Court on Human Rights has consistently held that ‘Reparation 
of harm brought about by the violation of an international obligation consists in full 
restitution (restitutio integrum), which includes the restoration of the prior situation 
…’ and compensation or other forms of indemnification for material and immaterial 
damages.79 The same principle has been applied by UN bodies responsible for 
oversight of state compliance with universal human rights and instruments, the ICJ, 
and the European Court on Human Rights, pursuant to Article 50 of the ECHR. 
 
The general principle of restitution in human rights law also applies to 
indigenous peoples. There is a difference in its application to indigenous peoples, 
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78  Boven (n 76 above) 57. 
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however, because indigenous people hold property rights individually and 
collectively. As van Boven stated, a 
 
coincidence of individual and collective aspects is particularly manifest with regard to the 
rights of indigenous peoples. Against this background it is therefore necessary that, in 
addition to individual means of reparation, adequate provision be made to entitle groups of 
victims or victimized communities to present collective claims for damages and to receive 
collective reparation accordingly.80  
 
He adds that: 
Vital to the life and well-being of indigenous peoples are land rights and rights relating to 
natural resources and the protection of the environment. Existing and emerging 
international law concerning the rights of indigenous peoples lays special emphasis on the 
protection of these collective rights and stipulates the entitlement of indigenous peoples to 
compensation in the case of damages resulting from exploration and exploitation 
programmes pertaining to their lands, and in case of relocation of indigenous peoples. The 
draft declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples [Article 27] recognizes the right to the 
restitution or, where this is not possible, to just and fair compensation for lands and 
territories which have been confiscated, occupied, used or damaged without their free and 
informed consent. Compensation shall preferably take the form of lands and territories of 
quality, quantity and legal status at least equal to those territories which were lost.81 
 
Article 28 of the UNDRIP states that: 
 
1.  Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include restitution or, 
when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and 
resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which 
have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior and 
informed consent. 
 
2.  Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, compensation shall take 
the form of lands, territories and resources equal in quality, size and legal status or of 
monetary compensation or other appropriate redress. 
 
In 1997 the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination also 
addressed this issue, and its General Recommendation XXIII called upon States 
parties:  
 
to recognize and protect the rights of indigenous peoples to own, develop, control and use 
their communal lands, territories and resources and, where they have been deprived of their 
lands and territories traditionally owned or otherwise inhabited or used without their free 
and informed consent, to take steps to return those lands and territories. Only when this is 
for factual reasons not possible, the right to restitution should be substituted by the right to 
just, fair and prompt compensation. Such compensation should as far as possible take the 
form of lands and territories.82 
 
In the case of indigenous peoples in Africa evicted for environmentally protected 
areas, some might want to argue that restitution of ancestral lands is impossible. This 
hypothesis has, however, been defeated in the ACHPR Endorois decision, that the 
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indigenous community rights of ownership of an area gazetted as a Game Reserve be 
recognised and that they should be granted unrestricted access to the said area.83 
 
Finally, ILO Convention 169 requires that indigenous peoples’ collective rights 
of ownership and possession over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be 
recognised.84 The term ‘traditionally occupy’ does not require a continued and 
present occupation, but rather, according to the ILO, ‘there should be some 
connection to the present’.85 Consequently, under ILO 169 – and ILO 107, which uses 
the same language – indigenous peoples have the right to restitution and recognition 
of their rights to lands ‘traditionally occupied’ that they have been expelled from or 
that they have lost title to or possession of in the recent past, including those 
incorporated into protected areas without their consent. In the case of relocation, 
both consensual and non-consensual, ILO 16986 also contains specified remedies: the 
right to return to traditional lands once the reason for relocation no longer pertains; 
allocation of lands of equal quality and legal status, unless the people(s) concerned 
express a preference for compensation; full compensation for any loss or injury 
resulting from relocation. 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
As highlighted, international law has played a mixed role regarding land rights in 
Africa. During the colonial era international law was an important factor in initiating 
the dispossession of indigenous peoples. The emergence of human rights law as a 
branch of international law marks an important change of approach. Indigenous 
peoples’ rights to land and natural resources are strongly affirmed and guaranteed by 
numerous inter-related human rights decisions and instruments, which emerged 
from both regional and international human rights mechanisms in recent years. The 
wide ratification by African states of international and regional instruments 
pertaining to indigenous peoples’ rights demonstrates a strong commitment toward 
the protection and promotion of indigenous land rights. However, the realisation of 
these rights through the implementation of the relevant decisions and instruments 
remains challenging. While international and regional bodies have created solid 
instruments and taken pioneering decisions, few of the principles expounded have 
been implemented in practice. Concrete measures are needed to translate the 
standards into reality, including those of the African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the 
United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination and 
the Convention on Biological Diversity. States can show greater commitment by 
ratifying other recent international and regional treaties engaging the rights of 
indigenous peoples, such as the revised African Convention on the Conservation of 
Nature and Natural Resources and ILO Convention 169. The principles and rights 
emerging from international law should be seen as minimum standards of protection 
for the rights of indigenous peoples, which no state legislation should fail to 
integrate. 
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The recognition of the existence of indigenous peoples in Africa is crucial to 
the realisation of the human rights guaranteed in international and regional 
instruments. Confusion around the concept of indigenous peoples has been 
recognised in documents of the Working Group on Indigenous 
Peoples/Communities, and few African countries recognise the existence of 
indigenous peoples on their territories.87 Recognition must be the starting point, and 
then indigenous peoples should be given the opportunity to reacquire their ancestral 
land and acquire legal property rights on these lands. International law is 
unequivocal: it provides for reallocation of ancestral land to indigenous peoples and, 
when this is impossible, the allocation of alternative lands. The ongoing reforms on 
land rights undertaken at the national level are opportunities for government to take 
affirmative measures to tackle the specific problems that indigenous peoples face. In 
some cases, reintegration on the ancestral lands is possible and compatible with 
environmental conservation objectives. In other cases, alternative land can be 
provided, in accordance with international standards. Additionally, urgent measures 
to fight extreme poverty and marginalisation can be taken while reforms are being 
implemented.  
 
Contemporary human rights law is also clear about participatory 
requirements in relation to decisions affecting indigenous peoples’ right to land, 
which must be validated through their free, prior and informed consent. 
Displacements and eviction of indigenous peoples have happened without them 
being consulted and involved in the decision. Still landless, indigenous peoples 
continue to be marginalised from decisions concerning land. Viable and fair 
solutions will only emerge from consultations with indigenous communities and 
their involvement in decision-making processes. 
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